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Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the hypothesis that promise-keeping be-
havior is affected by the opportunities that a counterpart foregoes by relying on
the promise. We present two motivational mechanisms that could drive such
an effect. One is that people dislike causing harm through a promise, and the
natural way to measure such harm is to take into account what the counterpart
would have received had she not relied on the promise. The other is that people
may dislike causing regret in another person. We test these ideas in the context
of an experimental trust game. The main treatment variable is the payoff that
the first mover forgoes if he “trusts”. Consistent with our main hypothesis, we
find that an increase in this foregone payoff increases promise-keeping behavior.
The experiment is designed to rule out alternative explanations for such an ef-
fect. Our evidence suggests that the mechanism driving the effect may involve
an aversion to causing regret in others.
1. Introduction
A large and active literature in experimental economics investigates motiva-
tional mechanisms involved in the fulfillment of promises (Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2017). Most of the existing
experimental work studies these motivations in the context of trust or invest-
ment games (Berg et al., 1995). Such games constitute a natural setting for the
investigation of promises because they capture the strategic structure of many
economic interactions in which promises are likely to play an important role. In
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these settings, a promise can serve to convince a potential partner to enter into
a cooperative arrangement of some type, e.g. a simple trade in which that party
is the first to deliver, or a more complex principal-agent relationship in which the
agent is promising to deliver a service. Importantly, a promise can also serve to
increase trustworthy behavior.
Within such settings, existing research suggests that at least two basic motiva-
tions contribute to explain the effectiveness of promises in increasing trustworthy
behavior. The first is that promises create expectations, and people have the
desire to fulfill expectations (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), or equivalently
an aversion to disappointing others. The second is that promises create obliga-
tions, and people have a desire to live up to obligations (contractual or other-
wise), or equivalently, find it psychologically costly to renege on such obligations
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Vanberg, 2008). A fundamental difference
between these two explanations is that the first explanation involves a concern
for the emotional state (or state of mind) of the promisee while the latter does
not. Although these theories have often been presented as mutually exclusive
alternatives, they are not. And indeed the existing evidence suggests that both
types of motivations (expectation-based and obligations-based) contribute to the
fulfillment of promises in simple laboratory settings (Ederer and Stremitzer, 2017;
Bhattacharya and Sengupta, 2016; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2019).
In this paper, we wish to introduce and investigate an additional consideration
which introspection suggests may be important for promise-keeping, but has so
far been neglected. The idea is that people may, when considering whether to
keep a promise, compare the outcome that they deliver if they do not keep their
promise with the outcome that the counterpart could have obtained if the promise
had never been made, or if she had not relied on the promise.
To illustrate, consider the following scenario. Bob dreams of opening a pub
but needs a partner in order to stem the necessary investments. His friend Ann
has substantial savings that she had so far intended to invest in an MSCI World
ETF. When Bob tells her of his plans, she tells him she is worried that he won’t
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work hard enough to make the pub profitable for both of them. Bob promises
that he will work hard, and Ann agrees to invest in the pub. A few months later,
the pub is open and running well. After a particularly long and exhausting night
behind the bar, Bob asks himself whether perhaps he should take it easy, even if
it means less profit than promised for Ann.
In this situation, existing theories of promise-keeping suggest that Bob would
ask himself questions like “how much money will Ann lose if I take it easy rather
than working hard like I promised?” and “how much money does Ann expect to
earn, and how does this compare to what she will get if I take it easy?" To this,
we wish to add questions like “what would Ann have done with her money if she
had not invested in the pub? How much money would she have earned if she
had not invested, and how does this compare to what she will receive if I take it
easy?” Our main hypothesis is that the answer to this question is relevant to Bob,
i.e. he will be more inclined to keep his promise, the larger are the opportunity
costs that Ann incurred when she relied on his promise (These costs are sunk
when Bob makes his decision.).
Within our example, a testable and substantively interesting implication of
our theory is that Bob’s willingness to work hard will depend on the value of the
MSCI World ETF that Ann would have bought if she had not invested in Bob’s
bar. If the return that she would have earned on the ETF is very high, Bob
will feel more obligated to fulfill his promise than if it was low or even negative.
That is, Bob’s motivation will depend on how the uncertainty regarding Ann’s
alternative investment is resolved after she has already decided not to invest in
that alternative.
We conjecture that there are two (potentially compatible) mechanisms un-
derlying this motivation, which differ in the extent to which they involve an
amplificaton of a “direct” concern about the fulfillment of a contractual obliga-
tion, or of a concern about the other’s state of mind. A “direct” moral cost of
breaking a promise has been previously modeled as a fixed cost independent of
the foregone payoff of the trustor (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004). Indeed,
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some authors have interpreted a “direct” preference for the fulfillment of obli-
gations as somehow by definition being independent of consequences. However,
this is not (or at least need not be) the key distinction. Instead, as noted above,
the main distinguishing feature of this type of explanation is that the underlying
concern is “direct” rather than working through a first-order concern about an-
other individual’s state of mind. However, how morally costly an individual finds
breaking his promise may well depend on what the promisee could have done
and would have received had she not followed his promise. If the foregone payoff
was low, the promisor may find it less morally costly to break his promise com-
pared to a high foregone payoff. A low foregone payoff may allow the promisor
to rationalize his decision to break a promise by arguing that the promisee, by
relying on his promise, will not lose much compared to her foregone option. But,
if the foregone payoff was high, the loss by relying on the promise is larger. Thus
one possibility that we wish to investigate is that the opportunity cost another
individual has incurred by relying on a promise amplifies the promisor’s “direct”
moral obligation to fulfill that promise.
The second motivation is that the promisors may face second-order regret
aversion. Regret theory suggests that the party who has relied on a promise
(Ann in our example) will compare the realized outcome with the outcome that
would have occurred, had they not relied on the promise. They experience regret
when (and to the extent that)the foregone outcome is better (Bell, 1982; Loomes
and Sugden, 1982; Zeelenberg et al., 1996). We conjecture that a promisor may
take in account the regret that a promisee would face if a promise is broken.
Such a concern might in turn be based on a combination of sympathy and the
wish to avoid anger directed at oneself. If Bob breaks his promise to work hard,
Ann is likely to regret her decision to rely on him. Moreover, she is likely to
feel more anger towards Bob if she learns that the MSCI World ETF that she
had been planning to buy performed well. If Bob cares about Ann’s regret, he
will keep his word more often if her alternative investment performed well. Note
that the fundamental difference between these two explanations is again that the
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second explanation takes into account the emotional state of the promisee while
the first does not. We will refer to the first explanation as moral cost explanation
and the second as the second-order regret-aversion explanation.
We test out theory in the context of an experimental investment game. In
our game, a first-mover (representing Ann in our example) chooses between an
outside option and an investment (Bob’s bar in our example). If she chooses the
outside option, the interaction ends. If she invests, the second mover chooses
between two options which we will refer to as ‘Fair’ and ‘Unfair’. Choosing Fair
results in an equal payoff to both. Choosing Unfair gives the second mover a
large payoff and the first mover a small payoff. The first mover is better off
investing if the second mover chooses Fair, but better off choosing the outside
option if the second mover chooses Unfair. The second mover always does better
if the first mover invests, but receives more money if he chooses Unfair over Fair.
We want to use this type of game to test i) whether promise-keeping is af-
fected by the payoff that the first mover foregoes by investing, and ii) whether
our two motivational mechanisms can explain this behavior. Note that as the
foregone payoff varies, a change in promise-keeping behavior could also be ex-
plained by an expectations-based account a la Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
Stone and Stremitzer (2017) showed that an increase in investment (and hence,
an increase in foregone payoff) leads to a change in higher-order expectations and
hence a change in promise-keeping behavior.1 In order to exclude this channel,
our experiment is designed to keep expectations constant even as the foregone
payoff varies. More generally, we will argue that the implication of our theory
in our experimental design distinguishes it from other (complementary) theories
such as distributional preferences, reciprocity, and guilt aversion.
In order to keep expectations constant while varying the outside payoff, we
1Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) vary the outside payment in their experiment. However,
since their focus was on showing that promises increase trustworthy behavior, they do not
compare promise-keeping rates across the two investment games. Furthermore, the outside
payoff of the second-mover also varies, creating additional confounds.
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modify the investment game in two important ways. First, Ann’s outside payoff
is unknown to her when she chooses whether or not to invest (like the return
to the MSCI world ETF in our example). Specifically, in our investment game,
the outside option is a lottery giving either a low or a high payoff. Second, the
uncertainty of the lottery is resolved, and Bob learns the outside payoff, before
he chooses between the fair and the unfair division.2 In the design section we
will argue that these modifications of the investment game allows us to keep the
expectations constant while varying the foregone payoff.
We use a 2x2 design where we vary whether i) Bob can send a one-way
message to Ann before she makes a choice (Communication), and ii) whether
Ann learns what she has foregone at the end of the investment game after all
choices have been made (Feedback). The variation in communication allows us
to test whether promise-keeping itself is affected by the foregone payoff. The
variation in feedback allows us to identify the motivations behind variation in
promise-keeping when the foregone payoff varies. When Ann never learns the
foregone outside payoff, a broken promise may induce regret, but the intensity
of regret would not depend on the realized outside payoff. Whereas, when she
learns about her outside payoff, her regret would depend on what is the realized
foregone payoff. This allows us to disentangle whether the variation in outside
payoff changes promise-keeping behavior because of change in anticipated regret
or through a change in obligation to keep a promise, or both.
We find that the foregone payoff affects the promisor’s motivation to choose
the Fair option, but only when both the parties know the realized foregone payoff.
Under the condition where Bob can promise and Ann learns the foregone payoff
later, the proportion of Fair choices is higher when the foregone payoff is high
as compared to when it is low. Moreover, when Ann learns the foregone payoff,
the difference in the choice of Fair between the high and the low foregone payoff
2In general, outside option in investment games represent alternative investment opportu-
nities. However, the alternative investment opportunities are also generally inherently risky, as
in the case of our example.
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is significantly greater when Bob can promise than when Bob cannot promise.
When Ann learns the foregone payoff, a change in promise-keeping behavior
with the foregone payoff can be attributed to both second-order regret aversion
and variation of moral cost . However, we find that when Ann never learns
the foregone outside payoff, the proportion of fair choice is statistically identical
between a high and low foregone payoff, both when Bob can promise and cannot
promise. These observations suggest that the “direct” moral cost associated
with breaking a promise is independent of the realized foregone payoff, and that
second-order regret-aversion is an important reason behind promise keeping
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2, we introduce
the design, lay down the predictions of our theories in terms of our design, and
explain why other social preference models and expectation based guilt cannot
explain a difference in promise-keeping behavior when the outside payoff varies.
In section 2.3, we introduce the experimental procedure. In section 3, we present
the results of the experiment. And finally, section 4 concludes.
2. Design and Procedure
2.1. Design
Figure 1 presents two versions of an investment game that will play a role in
our design. Ann, who is an investor, moves first and decides whether to Invest in
Bob’s project or choose Out (Out represents all other investment opportunities.).
Choosing to invest increases the total available amount to be shared between Bob
and Ann. However, if Ann decides to invest, Bob decides the amount he wants
to return. Bob can return a Fair amount, in which case both players receive
similar payoffs, or, Bob can choose Unfair, in which case he keeps most of the
money. In the investment game described, Bob has both an incentive to promise
to choose Fair if he can communicate with Ann, and a monetary incentive to
choose the Unfair amount if Ann invests. This, in turn, creates a disincentive
for Ann to invest.
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Ann
(3, 5)
Out
Bob
(9, 8)
Fair
(3, 14)
Unfair
Invest
(a) Low Outside Payoff
Ann
(7, 5)
Out
Bob
(9, 8)
Fair
(3, 14)
Unfair
Invest
(b) High Outside Payoff
Figure 1: Investment Games
Note that the games presented in Figure 1 differ only in the payoff that Ann
would receive if she chooses Out. An implication of our theory is that Bob’s
motivation to keep a promise to choose Fair will be affected by this outside
payoff. Specifically, the theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, Bob will be more
likely to keep a promise to choose Fair in the game on the right, where Ann has
foregone a payoff of 7, than in the game on the left, where she has foregone only
3. The underlying motivations, recall, are that (i) Bob’s moral cost of breaking a
promise may depend on the extent to which a broken promise harms Ann relative
to what she would have received had she not relied on his promise and/or (ii)
Bob may be concerned about the intensity of the regret and anger that Ann feels
when he breaks his promise.
Although we do not intend to present a fully developed formalization of our
theory, it may help to provide a sketch of such a theory in a form that is, for the
moment, specific to our setting. Denote Ann’s payoff from the outside option
by αk, where k = H or L and αH = 7 and αL = 3 . Then if Bob has promised
to choose Fair, his payoff from choosing Fair is uB(9, 8) where uB(xA, xB) is
a purely consequentialist value that Bob attaches to the distribution (xA, xB)
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(including ‘non-standard’ distributional preferences). And his payoff from break-
ing his promise by choosing Unfair is uB(3, 14) − η(αK − 3) − µ(αK − 3),
where η represents the moral cost of breaking a promise while µ represents the
effect of second-order regret aversion. Note that both η and µ are increas-
ing functions representing Bob’s disutility from the ‘harm’ he is causing rela-
tive to Ann’s outside option.3 Then Bob will choose to keep his promise if
η(αK − 3)+µ(αK − 3) > uB(3, 14)−uB(9, 8). For a given αK , the truth value
of this condition will depend on Bob’s distributional preferences with respect to
the possible outcomes. If Bob is sufficiently inequity averse or altruistic, the right
hand side of the inequality may be negative, so that he would keep his promise
even if η(αK − 3) + µ(αK − 3) = 0. If he is purely selfish, he will do so only if
η(αK − 3) + µ(αK − 3) is sufficiently large. In practice, we would expect there
to be some heterogeneity, both with respect to the relevant distributional prefer-
ences, as well as with respect to the motivation we are discussing. Therefore the
theory does not provide a specific prediction about an isolated individual choice.
However, it does make the comparative static prediction that an increase in αK
should lead to an increase in the proportion of individuals for whom the condition
is satisfied, and therefore in the proportion of subjects who choose to keep their
promise.
A comparison of promise-keeping behavior across investment games in figure
1 which only differs in the outside payoff is not sufficient to test our theory,
since other theories would also predict a difference in promise keeping rates. For
example, Ann’s choice of Invest is likely to induce higher second-order beliefs
when the outside payoff is high, such that the theory of expectations-based guilt
aversion predicts the same effect as our theory.4 The modified investment game
3Specifically, η and µ are functions of a distance metric, d(αK , xA) which itself is a function
of α and xA, η(d(α
K , xA)) and µ(d(α
K , xA)). Both η and µ are increasing function of the
distance metric d(αK , xA) . To keep our exposition simple, in our example we use d(α, xA) =
αK − xA.
4Ann’s choice to invest acts as a signal of Ann’s minimum expected return from Bob, since
otherwise she would not have invested. If Ann invests, the minimum expected returns from
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we present not only keeps the expectations constant while varying the outside
payoff, but also allows us to disentangle the two motivations we suggest can
explain a difference in promise-keeping behavior.
Nature
Ann
(3, 5)
Out
Bob
(9, 8)
Fair
(3, 14)
Unfair
Invest
Low
Ann
(7, 5)
Out
Bob
(9, 8)
Fair
(3, 14)
Unfair
Invest
High
Ann
Figure 2: Modified Investment Game
Figure 2 represents our modified investment game, which involves uncertainty
in the outside payoff. Nature moves first and determines the payoff Ann would
receive if she chooses Out. Nature draws either a High or a Low outside pay-
off with equal probability. After Nature draws the outside payoff, Ann decides
whether to Invest or stay Out without learning Nature’s draw. If Ann chooses
Out, she receives a payoff of e3 when the outside option is Low, and she receives
e7 when it is High. Bob’s payoff if Ann chooses Out is e5 in both states (equal
to the expected payoff of Ann’s outside option). After Ann makes a decision,
investment is e3 in figure 1a and e7 in figure 1b. Expectations-based explanation of promise-
keeping would predict that promises will be kept more often when the foregone payoff is e7
than when it is e3.
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Bob learns the foregone payoff of Ann (i.e. Bob learns whether the outside option
is High or Low). If Ann chose to invest, he chooses either a Fair or an Unfair
division of the total available amount of e17. If Bob Chooses Fair, then Ann
receives e9 and Bob receives e8. If Bob Chooses Unfair, then Ann receives e3
and Bob receives e14.
Since the uncertainty regarding Nature’s move is resolved only after Ann
makes her choice, Ann’s expectation concerning Bob’s behavior is unaffacted
by the realized value of the outside option. Bob learns the foregone payoff
before he makes a choice, but he knows that Ann was not aware of it when she
made her choice. Therefore we would expect his second-order expectation to
be independent of the realized foregone payoff. Thus we expect both first- and
second-order expectations to be independent of the realized foregone payoff.
If Bob could communicate, expectations will increase, however for the same
logic, the first and the second-order expectations will remain unaffected by the
realized foregone payoff. Moreover, note that Bob communicates to Ann before
she makes a choice and hence before the uncertainty is resolved. This additionally
allows us to keep the motivation to promise independent of the realized foregone
payoff.5
To understand the effect of the foregone payoff on promise-keeping, and to
disentangle the two motivations which can explain changes in promise-keeping
behavior, we vary whether (i) Bob can send a message to Ann before Ann makes
an investment decision (Communication) or not (No Communication) and (ii)
whether Ann learns her realized foregone outside payoff at the end of the interac-
tion (Feedback) or not (No Feedback). Table 1 shows all 4 treatments. Our main
outcome variable of interest is Bob’s choice of Fair. In Table 1, F represents
the proportion of Fair choice. The superscript indicates whether the foregone
payoff is H igh or Low. The subscripts represent the treatment (e.g. ‘ncf’ = No
Communication and Feedback). We now layout our hypotheses in terms of our
5Knowledge of the exact foregone payoff before Bob makes a promise could affect both his
motivation to make a promise and the content of the message.
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main variable of interest, proportion of Fair (F) choice.
Table 1: Treatments
No Feedback Feedback
No Communication FHncnf , F
L
ncnf F
H
ncf , F
L
ncf
Communication FHcnf , F
L
cnf F
H
cf , F
L
cf
ncnf = no communication, no feedback; ncf = no communication feedback; cnf = communication no
feedback; cf = communication feedback. For example, FHcf represents the proportion of Fair choice when the
foregone payoff was high in the Communication Feedback treatment.
2.2. Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis concerns the effects of the outside option on promise-
keeping in a context where the second mover (Ann) learns the value of the outside
option following the interaction. Recall that in this case, we conjecture that the
outside option may affect promise keeping for two reasons. First, Bob may be
concerned about the intensity of regret and anger that Ann will experience if
he breaks a promise to choose Fair. This intensity, µ(αK − 3), is likely to be
increasing in the value of the outside option. Second, Bob may be concerned
about the harm that he imposes on Ann, and we conjecture that Bob measures
“harm” by comparing Ann’s payoff to her foregone payoff, η(αK−3). Therefore,
the utility of Bob when he breaks his promise can be written as uB(3, 14)−η(αK−
3) − µ(αK − 3). Note that both these motivations work in the same direction
when Ann learns the foregone payoff (and has therefore a reason to regret her
decision differently based on the foregone payoff.).
Naturally, it is possible that Bob entertains similar thoughts even in the
absence of a promise. That is, Bob may be more likely to chose Fair when the
foregone payoff is large, even in our “No Communication” condition. To test
the idea that the foregone payoff increases the effect of promises, we test the
Hypothesis that the difference in the proportion of Fair choices between the low
and the high foregone payoff will be larger when individuals can communicate
(and presumably promises) than when individuals cannot communicate.
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Hypothesis 1: The difference in the proportion of fair choice between the
high and the low foregone payoff in the Feedback Communication treatment
will be larger than the difference in the Feedback No Communication treatment.
Ha : [(F
H
cf − FLcf )− (FHncf − FLncf )] > 0
Without feedback, Ann never learns what she had foregone when she invested
in Bob. Thus, when she observes a broken promise, she may regret her decision,
but her regret (and anger towards Bob) would not depend on the foregone pay-
off. Consequently, Bob’s second-order regret should not be dependent on the
realized foregone payoff. This means that Bob’s utility function is represented
by uB(3, 14)− η(αK − 3)− [12µ(α
k − 3) + 1
2
µ(αJ − 3)] and for a given αK he
will choose to keep his promise if η(αK − 3) + [1
2
µ(αk − 3) + 1
2
µ(αJ − 3)] >
uB(9, 8)− uB(3, 14). However, note that the difference in promise keeping rate
in the No Feedback condition when the foregone payoff varies is only predicted
by a change in moral cost, η(αK − xA), as the level of second order regret,
[1
2
µ(αk− 3)+ 1
2
µ(αJ − 3)], remains the same regardless of whether the foregone
payoff was low or high. Therefore, any variation in promise-keeping due to fore-
gone payoff would be explained only by Bob being directly concerned about the
harm he is causing as compared to Ann’s outside option (moral cost mechanism).
Therefore, if Bob’s cost of breaking a promise is directly affected by the foregone
payoff, we should find support for the following Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The difference in the proportion of fair choice between the
high and the low foregone payoff in the No Feedback Communication treatment
will be larger than the difference in the No Feedback No Communication treat-
ment. Ha : [(F
H
cnf − FLcnf )− (FHncnf − FLncnf )] > 0
In the Feedback condition, the difference in the promise-keeping rate could
be driven by a change in the moral cost of breaking a promise or a change in
second-order regret when the foregone payoff varies. Without feedback, only
a change in the moral cost of breaking a promise can explain a difference in
promise-keeping. This allows us to decompose the effect of foregone payoff on
promise-keeping due to variation in the cost of breaking a promise and second-
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order regret aversion. The additional difference in promise-keeping rate between
the high and the low foregone payoff in the Feedback condition over and above
the difference in promise-keeping in the No Feedback condition would capture
the effect of second-order regret aversion on promise-keeping. Thus, if second-
order regret aversion affects promise keeping, we expect support for the following
Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The difference in difference of the proportion of choice of Fair
between the Communication Feedback treatment and the No Communication
Feedback treatment will be larger than the difference in difference between the
Communication Feedback treatment and the No Communication Feedback treat-
ment. Ha : [(F
H
cf −FLcf )− (FHncf−FLncf )]− [(FHcnf−FLcnf )− (FHncnf−FLncnf )] > 0
Our design rules out other social preference models, along with expecta-
tion based guilt aversion, as an explanation for the variation in promise-keeping.
Outcome-based social preference models are based on comparisons of the final
distribution of payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
In our design, if Ann chooses In, the final distribution of payoffs is unaffected by
the realized Out payoff. Thus, outcome-based social preference models would
predict the same promise-keeping behavior regardless of the realized foregone
payoff.
Intention based reciprocity models cannot explain differences in Bob’s behav-
ior based on foregone payoff (Levine, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2009). The standard theory of intention-based reciprocity has
a counter-intuitive prediction. It predicts negative reciprocity from Bob if Ann
chooses Invest because Ann’s decision to invest can be interpreted by Bob as
Ann wanting him to choose Fair. Since choosing Fair gives lower payoff to Bob
than choosing Unfair, Ann’s act of investment can be viewed as an unkind act by
Bob. However, the negative reciprocity is independent of the realized foregone
payoff. It is also possible that Bob views an act of investment as a kind action as
it allows him to receive a higher payoff compared to the outside option. Even so,
Bob should not reciprocate differently to Ann’s kindness based on the foregone
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outside payoff as Bob’s payoff is the same across the high and the low foregone
options.
Finally, the design also rules out image concern as a motivation for differential
promise-keeping behavior. Image concern theory posits that individuals care
about how they appear to others and themselves (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
Deviating from socially acceptable norms of behavior could lead to both a fall
in social and self-image. The norm of promise-keeping suggests that breaking a
promise could lead to a loss in both social and self-image (Schütte and Thoma,
2014; Grubiak et al., 2019). If image concern matters, then, to avoid a negative
image from being branded as a liar, Bob would keep his promise. However, the
loss of image is dependent on the promised choice and the final choice, but not
on the foregone payoff. Moreover, in our experiment, if Ann chose In, there is
no uncertainty in Bob’s choice. A broken promise is always detectable.
2.3. Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Alfred-Weber Institute laboratory at
Heidelberg University. Subjects were students of the university and were re-
cruited using Hroot and Sona. The design was between subjects, each subject
participated only in one of the four different treatments. The experiment was
programmed using Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007). We explain in detail the procedure
for the Communication condition with Feedback.6 The procedure for the other
three treatments was identical except for the treatment variation.
Subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal in the lab. The
instruction for the experiment was displayed to the subjects on the computer
screen. The instruction appeared over several pages and the subjects could move
forward and backward between the pages while reading the instruction. They
were also handed out written instruction. When all subjects indicated that they
had finished reading the instruction by pressing the “done reading” button which
6The subjects were given a German version of the instruction. Appendix A contains the
English version of the instruction.
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appeared on the last page of the instruction, the experiment proceeded to the
main stage.
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject was randomly assigned to
a matching group of size six. All interactions took place within the matching
group. Half of the subjects in a matching group were assigned the role of Bob
and the other half to the role of Ann. Their roles remained the same for the entire
experiment. There were nine rounds. In each round, Ann and Bob were randomly
matched within their matching group and they played the game represented in
Figure 2.7
Within a round, Bob first had an opportunity to send a free form message
to Ann. If he did not want to send a message, he could leave the message
box blank. After Ann observed Bob’s message, she decided whether to Invest
or stay Out without knowing the realized outside payoff. We used the strategy
method to elicit Bob’s choice. Bob had to decide whether to choose the Fair or
the Unfair option assuming that Ann has invested.8 Before he made his choice,
the uncertainty about the foregone payoff was resolved. Bob flipped a virtual
coin that had an equal probability of landing Head or Tails and observed the
outcome of the coin flip. Had Ann chosen Out, if the outcome of the coin flip
was Heads, Ann would have received the low payoff, and if it was Tails, she would
have received the high payoff. The outcome of the coin flip did not affect Bob’s
payoff had Ann chosen Out. Bob then chose between the Fair and the Unfair
option. After they made their choice, they stated their beliefs. Ann stated on a
scale of 1-5 how likely Bob is going to choose the Fair option, with 1 indicating
that she is sure that Bob would choose the Unfair option and 5 indicating that
she is sure that Bob would choose the Fair option. Bob was asked to guess the
7Since each matching group had six subjects, and the game was repeated nine times, each
individual in the role of Ann and Bob interacted more than once. The pairing was constructed
such that no same individuals met twice in a row. Learning is limited in our experiment as
neither players received any information about others choice until the end of the experiment.
8Action labels used in the experiment were neutral. Unfair choice was labeled as Option 1
and Fair choice was labeled as Option 2.
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number Ann had stated. The belief procedure was incentivized using a modified
scoring rule used in Vanberg (2008). After the beliefs were stated, the round
ended, and a new round began. No information about others choices was given
to players between rounds. Choice information and outcomes were displayed
for all nine rounds at the end of the experiment. Furthermore, in the feedback
condition, Ann also learned her foregone outside payoff.9
In our experiment, subjects received a show-up fee of e3. If Ann chose Out,
then Ann received a payoff of e3 or e5 and Bob received e5. If Ann chose In and
Bob chose Fair, Ann received e9 and Bob received e8. We used three different
payoff constellations for Ann and Bob if Ann chose In and Bob chose Unfair.
Bob received either e13 or e14 or e15 and Ann received the remaining of the
e17 that Bob was splitting. In a round, only one of the three Unfair payoffs were
used, but the Unfair payoff varied across rounds. The exact payoff structures
were common knowledge before Ann and Bob made any decisions. They also
knew that Unfair choice payoff would change across rounds. The ordering of the
Unfair choice payoffs over rounds were randomized across sessions.
3. Results
In this section, we present the results from the experiment. Our main variables
of interest are (i) the proportion of choice of Fair and (ii) the difference in
the proportion of choice of Fair between the high and the low foregone payoff.
In section 3.1.1, we present results from the Feedback treatments and analyze
whether variation in foregone payoff affects promise-keeping behavior. In section
3.1.2, we investigate whether the variation in promise-keeping is due to variation
in preference for promise-keeping when foregone payoff varies. In section 3.1.3,
9In the Feedback condition, Ann always learned the outside payoff, regardless of her choice
of In or Out. However, if she chose Out, she did not learn what she would have received
had she chosen In. Though we have information about Bob’s choice because of the strategy
method elicitation, this information structure is consistent with the sequential nature of the
game. Bob would not have made a chosen if Ann chose Out. Hence, there is no counter-factual
information regarding Bob’s choice if Ann chose Out.
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Table 2: Messages
Strong Promise Weak Promise Promise Empty
No Feedback 42.39%(103/243) 19.75%(48/243) 62.14%(151/243) 37.86%(92/151)
Feedback 63.79% (155/243) 11.11% (27/243) 74.90%(182/243) 25.10% (61/243)
we decompose the effect of foregone payoff on promise-keeping due to variation
in second-order regret and variation in the cost of breaking a promise.1011
We use non-parametric tests and linear probability regression model to test
our hypotheses. All our statistical analyses are done at the matching group level,
i.e., each independent observation is the proportion of fair choice at the matching
group level conditional on whether the foregone payoff was low or high.12 We had
eighteen participants in each session. We ran three sessions for each treatment.
Since we analyze data at the matching group level, for each treatment, we have
nine independent observations each for Ann and Bob.
3.1. Bob’s Choice
3.1.1. Feedback
In the communication condition, Bob could send a free-form message to Ann
before she made a decision. The messages were coded into three categories. They
were coded as Strong Promise if Bob clearly expressed his intent to choose the
fair option. They were coded as Weak Promise if the message suggests a choice
10Since our main interest is in Bob’s promise keeping behavior, the statistical analysis of
Bob’s second-order beliefs and Ann’s choices and beliefs are presented in Appendix B and
Appendix C, respectively.
11The statistical analysis is done by pooling choices across all rounds. The Unfair payoff
for Ann and Bob varied across rounds. As the Unfair payoff increases, Bob has a stronger
incentive to renege on his promise. However, foregone payoff should still affect promise-keeping
behavior differently. We varied the Unfair to pick up switch points for Bob, but given the size
of the data, we are under-powered to analyze behavior based on the unfair payoff. We present
the averages in Tables E.18 and E.19 in the appendix.
12Matching groups were groups of size 6 that were randomly formed before the start of
the experiment in a session. In a matching group, three of them were randomly assigned the
role of Ann and the other three the role of Bob. The investment game pairs were formed by
randomly pairing players in the role of Ann and Bob within a matching group.
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of the fair option. The rest of the messages were classified as Empty Talk.13
Table 2 shows the number of messages in each category. For our statistical
analyses, we consider both a weak and a strong promise as a promise.14 We
first look at the proportion of fair choice and its difference in the communication
condition for the complete data and then we look at the proportion of fair choice
and its difference conditional on a promise being sent.
Table 3: Proportion of Fair Choice(Feedback)
Low High Difference
No Communication 27.19% 18.73% -8.46 (p = 0.02)
Communication 36.09% 54.64% 18.55 (p = 0.02)
Promise 43.69% 59.63% 15.94 (p = 0.06)
Numbers in the table represent the proportion of Fair choice. p- values reported are
from Sign-Rank test.
Table 3 represents the proportion of fair option chosen by Bob in the Feedback
conditions. Under the communication condition, the proportion of fair choice is
36.09% and 54.64% under the low and the high foregone payoff respectively. The
difference in the proportion of the choice of Fair between the high and the low
foregone payoff is 18.55%. Figure 3 shows the difference in the proportion of Fair
choice at the matching group level between the high and the low foregone payoff.
The observations are arranged in ascending order and the rank of observation is
signed according to the sign of the observation. If the differences were randomly
distributed, then the observations in Figure 3 would have been equally distributed
around zero. As can be seen, in the communication condition, the difference in
choice is positive for most of the matches. The median value of the difference is
14.29% in the Communication condition (vertical blue line) and is significantly
13Messages were coded independently by one of the authors and a research assistant. The
coders disagreed on 22 out of 486 observations, mostly on Weak Promises. The discrepancies
were resolved together.
14Our results do not change if we only restrict our data to Strong Promise.
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different from zero (Sign-Rank, p = 0.02).
In the Feedback condition with communication, 74.90% (182/243) messages
were coded as a promise. If we only consider observations where a promise was
sent, the proportion of fair choice is 43.69% and 59.63% under the low and the
high foregone payoff respectively. The matching group level difference in choice
of fair option between the high and the low outside option is 15.94%. The median
value of the distribution of differences is 16.66% and it is significantly different
from 0 (Sign-Rank, p = 0.06).
Result 1a: We find that when individuals can promise and Ann learns the
foregone payoff, the proportion of choice of fair is higher under the high compared
to the low foregone payoff.
These observations are consistent with the conjecture that foregone payoff
affects promise-keeping behavior, but, to conclude that foregone payoff indeed
affects behavior due to the interaction with communication, we need to rule out
a similar behavioral pattern in the No Communication condition.
When Bob could not communicate, the proportion of fair choice was 27.19%
and 18.73% under the low and the high outside option respectively. There is an
8.46% point drop in the choice of Fair moving from the low to the high foregone
payoff. As can be seen from Figure 3, the difference in choice is negative for
most of the matches. The median of the difference in fair choice is significantly
different from 0 and is negative (Sign-Rank, p = 0.02) contrary to our expecta-
tions of a positive or zero difference between the high and the low outcome. This
suggests that Bobs who cannot promise were likely to choose the fair option less
when the foregone payoff was high compared to low.
This result was unexpected. We conjecture that since Bob chooses without
knowing exactly what Ann has chosen, he might think of his choice as a choice
between lotteries. When he observes a high outside option payoff instead of a
low outside option payoff, he might feel that Ann has a possibility to earn a
higher amount if she has chosen Out, thus making it easier for him to choose the
lottery which implements the Unfair choice if Invest is chosen. Holding every
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Figure 3: Distribution of differences (Feedback)
Note: Each observation represents a single matching group. The vertical axis measures the difference in the
proportion of fair choice between high and low foregone payoff. The observations are ranked in ascending
order within a treatment. The horizontal position of each observation corresponds to the signed rank of that
observation, where the sign of the rank is positive if the difference is positive and negative if the difference is
negative. The dashed horizontal lines indicate the average of the observations. The dashed vertical lines mark
the median observations.
other motivation constant, this would mean that Bob would be more likely to
choose the Fair option under the low than the high foregone payoff. As we
use the strategy method in our experiment, this motivation is present in all our
treatments. Our difference in difference analysis therefore takes care that this
motivation does not affect our results.
Result 1b: We find that when individuals cannot communicate and Ann
learns the foregone payoff, the proportion of the choice of fair is lower under the
high compared to the low foregone payoff.
To understand the effect of foregone payoff on promises, we need to com-
pare the difference in the proportion of fair choice across the Communication
and the No Communication condition. The average difference in difference be-
21
tween the Communication and No Communication condition is 27.03% points.
Figure 3 shows that while the matching group level differences in the Communi-
cation condition are mostly positive, in the No Communication condition, they
are mostly negative. The distributions of the differences are significantly differ-
ent between the Communication and the No communication condition (Rank
Sum, p < 0.001). If we restrict our data only to promisors, then the difference
in difference between the Communication and No Communication condition is
24.41% points and the distributions of the differences are also significantly dif-
ferent between the two (Rank Sum, p = 0.004). This suggests that the positive
differences observed in the communication condition are indeed related to an
interaction effect of promises and foregone payoff.
Further evidence of Hypothesis 1 is provided by linear probability model in
column I of Table 5.15 The dependent variable is Bob’s choice with 1 indicating
a Fair choice and 0 otherwise. High takes the value 1 if the outside payoff
was high and 0 otherwise. Communication takes the value 1 if Bob could
send a message and 0 otherwise. HighXCommunication is the interaction
term between High and Communication. The coefficient of High is negative,
indicating that when individuals cannot communicate, they choose the fair option
more often under the low than under the high outside option. The coefficient
on communication is also positive, indicating that there is an increase in the
choice of Fair moving from No communication to Communication under the
low foregone payoff, but, it is not significant. Finally, our variable of interest,
the interaction term between High and Communication, which measures the
difference in difference in choice of fair option between high and low foregone
payoff moving from No communication to Communication condition, is positive
and significant, consistent with hypothesis 1. The qualitative results do not
change if we restrict observations in the Communication condition to only those
15To check for robustness, we also use a logistic and probit model with clustering at the
matching group level. The results are reported in Table D.14 and D.15 and are qualitatively
similar to the results reported in the main text.
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who have sent a promise (Table D.12).
Result 1: In line with Hypothesis 1, we find that if an individual promises,
then an increase in foregone payoff leads to an increase in proportion of fair
choice.
3.1.2. No Feedback
Table 4: Proportion of Fair choice (No Feedback)
Low High Difference
No Communication 28.46% 26.37% -2.09 (p = 0.51)
Communication 58.05% 50.5% -7.55 (p = 0.25)
Promise 75.88% 71.02% -4.84 (p = 0.67)
Numbers in the table represent the proportion of Fair choice. p- values reported are
from Sign-Rank test.
In the last section, we found that higher foregone payoff leads to higher
promise-keeping. This behavioral pattern can be explained by both second-order
regret-aversion and a variation in the moral cost of breaking a promise. In this
section, we analyze the data from the No Feedback conditions, where regret is
no longer dependent on the foregone payoff and any variation in choice due to
variation of the foregone payoff can be attributed to a change in the moral cost
of breaking a promise. Table 4 represents the proportion of choice of Fair. When
Bob could communicate, the proportion of the choice of fair option is 58.50%
and 50.05% under the low and the high outcome respectively. There is a decrease
of 7.55% point in the choice of Fair moving from low to high foregone payoff.
However, as can be seen from Figure 4, in the communication condition, the
matching group level differences are equally likely to be positive, negative or very
close to zero. The median of the distribution of the differences does not differ
significantly from 0 (Sign-Rank, p = 0.51).
In the No Feedback condition with communication, 62.14% (151/243) of the
messages sent were a promise. If we restrict observations where only promises
are sent, the proportion of choice of fair option is 75.88% and 71.02% under
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Figure 4: Distribution of differences (No Feedback)
the low and the high outcome respectively. The median of the distribution of
the differences does not differ significantly from 0 (Sign-Rank, p = 0.67). The
lack of any difference in choice suggests that the cost of breaking a promise is
independent of the harm done relative to the foregone payoff.
Result 2a: We find that proportion of fair choice does not differ between
high and low outcomes when Bob can promise and Ann never learns the foregone
payoff.
To formally come to this conclusion, we now compare the difference in choice
of Fair between the high and the low foregone payoff in the Communication con-
dition to the No Communication condition. When Bob could not communicate,
the Fair option is chosen 28.46% and 26.37% under the low and the high fore-
gone payoff. There is a small decrease of 2.09% in choice of Fair moving from
low to high foregone payoff, but the median of the distribution of the differ-
ence does not differ significantly from 0 (Sign-Rank, p = 0.51). Comparing
the difference in choice of Fair across the high and low foregone payoff between
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the Communication and No Communication condition, we cannot reject the null
that the distributions of the differences are identical across the two (Rank Sum,
p = 0.45). If we restrict observations only to promises in the Communication
condition, we still cannot reject the null that the distributions of the differences
are identical across the Communication and the No Communication condition
(Rank Sum, p = 0.75)
Result 2b: We find that proportion of fair choice does not differ between
the high and the low outcomes when Bob cannot communicate and Ann never
learns the foregone payoff.
Further evidence of this observation is provided by regression specification
II in Table 5. The only coefficient that is significant and positive is the coef-
ficient of Communication. The coefficient of High and the interaction term
between High and Communication is not significantly different from zero. The
results are similar if we restrict observations in the communication condition to
only those who have sent a promise (Table D.12). This observation tells us that
promise-keeping behavior is unaffected by the foregone payoff if the investor never
learns what she had foregone. This suggests that the moral cost of breaking a
promise is independent of the harm done relative to the foregone payoff, consis-
tent with the constant cost model of commitment by Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004).
Result 2: Contrary to Hypothesis 2, we find that when Ann never learns the
foregone payoff and Bob promises, then the proportion of fair choice is unaffected
by the foregone payoff.
3.1.3. Evidence For Second-Order Regret Aversion
In section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, we found that the promise-keeping rate depends
on the foregone payoff in the Feedback condition, but not in the No Feedback
condition. This suggests that promise-keeping is driven by second-order regret
and not a change in the moral cost of reneging on a promise. In this section,
we present a formal statistical result where we decompose the effect of foregone
payment on the moral cost of reneging on a promise and second-order regret-
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Table 5: Linear Probability Model
I
Feedback
II
No Feedback
III
Combined
High
-0.087**
(0.035)
-0.032
(0.058)
-0.032
(0.057)
Communication
0.084
(0.096)
0.306***
(0.075)
0.306***
(0.074)
High*Communication
0.248***
(0.069)
-0.064
(0.083)
-0.064
(0.082)
Feedback
-0.016
(0.076)
Communication*Feedback
-0.222***
(0.120)
High*Feedback
-0.055
(0.067)
High*Communication*Feedback
0.312***
(0.107)
Constant
0.271***
(0.060)
0.287***
(0.048)
0.287***
(0.047)
Number of observations 486 486 972
R2 0.62 0.60 0.60
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the matching group level. ∗p < .10,
∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
aversion.
Specification III in Table 5 reports results from the combined data. The
variable Feedback takes the value 1 when feedback was provided to Ann and
0 otherwise. The model includes interaction terms between Feedback and
Communication, Feedback and High, and a triple interaction term between
High, Feedback and Communication. The interaction term of High and
Communication is the effect of the foregone payoff on the promise-keeping
rate in the No Feedback condition. Therefore, it captures variation in promise-
keeping rate due to a change in the moral cost of reneging on a promise as
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the foregone payoff varies. The triple interaction term captures the variation in
promise-keeping rate in the Feedback condition after controlling for the variation
in promise-keeping under the No Feedback condition. Thus, it captures the effect
of second-order regret on promise-keeping as foregone payoff varies.
We find that the coefficient of the triple interaction term is positive and
significant. As expected, the size of the coefficient is similar to the size of the
coefficient on HighXCommunication in specification I.16 Furthermore, the in-
teraction term between Communication and High in specification III is not
significant. This is consistent with our observation that the moral cost of break-
ing a promise does not vary with the foregone payoff. These two observations
together confirm that when there is no feedback, promise-keeping is unaffected
by the realized outside payoff, but significantly increases with an increase in
foregone payoff when there is feedback. This suggests that any difference in
promise-keeping rate due to variation in the foregone payoff is due to second-
order regret aversion and not due to variation in the moral cost of reneging on
a promise. Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction term between Com-
munication and Feedback is negative and significant. This is in line with our
observation that promise-keeping falls with feedback if the foregone option was
low. However, feedback does not affect the promise-keeping rate if the foregone
payoff was high.17 Qualitative results are the same if we restrict attention to
only those who promised (Table D.12).
Result 3: After accounting for the change in promise-keeping due to a change
16Note that the coefficient of the interaction term HighXCommunication in specification
I captures both the average effect of the foregone payoff on promise-keeping due to a variation
in second-order regret and a change in the cost of reneging on a promise.
17One may suggest that observing no difference in promise-keeping rate between Feedback
and No Feedback under the high foregone payoff speaks against the theory of second-order
regret aversion. However, this is not necessarily true. In the No Feedback condition, Ann never
learns the foregone payoff. Therefore, how much regret Bob thinks Ann would suffer depends
on what Bob thinks Ann believes about the foregone payoff. No difference in choice for the
high foregone payoff is consistent with Bob believing that under No Feedback, Ann believes
the foregone option was high.
27
in the foregone payoff from Low to High in the No Feedback condition, we find
that the change in promise-keeping due to a change in the foregone payoff in
the Feedback condition is still positive and significant, which is captured by the
triple interaction term in our regression.
4. Discussion
Our paper contributes to the literature on communication and investment
games in two ways. First, we propose and test the hypothesis that people will
be more likely to keep a promise, the large the opportunity costs that their
counterpart incurred by relying on it. We find support for this hypothesis. Our
findings are consistent with the idea that the underlying mechanism involves
second-order regret aversion as a motivational factor that drives people to keep
their promise. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to show that
promise-keeping behavior is supported by second-order regret aversion. However,
we do not find evidence that the moral cost of breaking a promise is itself affected
by the harm that a broken promise imposes relative to the foregone payoff.
Second, we introduce a trust game which has an uncertain payoff from the
outside option instead of a certain payoff. This is a relevant feature in many
real-world investment transactions. In such situations, our data suggest that
information about the foregone payoff is an important indicator of when promises
will be kept. If only the promisor knows what the promisee has foregone to invest
in him, the realized foregone payoff does not affect promise-keeping behavior.
However, when both the promisor and the promisee know the realized foregone
option, then a bad foregone option leads to lower promise-keeping compared
to a good foregone option. This suggests that investors should strategically
avoid information about what she has foregone if she has already invested. If
the investor could choose to find out what the actual realized foregone payoff
was, she is better off not revealing the information to herself if the choice of
not revealing the information itself does not adversely affect promise-keeping
behavior; or if she does reveal the information, she is better off if the promisor is
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unaware that she knows the foregone payoff. Furthermore, it also suggests that
the promisor may want to strategically communicate the foregone payoff to the
investor when the foregone payoff is low.
Our paper also relates to the literature on contract law. In contract law, a
non-binding promise can be viewed as a binding promise enforceable by law if
such a promise induced the promisee to take an action that the promisee would
have otherwise not taken (Restatement (second) of contracts § 90(1) (1979)).
Under promissory estoppel, generally two forms of penalties are imposed on the
party which is guilty of breaking the promise.18 The promisor could be asked
to pay “expectation damage”, which requires the promisee to be put in position
she would have been in had the promise been kept. Or the promisor could be
asked to pay “reliance damage”, which requires the promisee to be restored in
the position she would have been in had the promise never been made. Thus, in
law, the amount of blame one faces and the penalty one has to pay is not just
dependent on what the position of the promisee is when the promise is broken and
what could have been had the promise been kept, but also what the position had
been if the promisee did not rely on the promise in the first place. This in turn
suggests that deterrence to break a promise when there is legal recourse is lower
when the foregone payoff is low compared to when it is high. Our results show
that the promise-keeping behavior in absence of legal punishment also follows the
pattern which the promisor would have followed had there been a legal recourse
like reliance damage. The promisor internalizes the regret and hence the blame
that the promisee would attribute to him even in absence of legal enforcement.
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Appendix A. Instructions: Communication and Feedback (Lab Lan-
guage: German)
On screen instructions
Page 0: (Displayed when subjects enter the lab)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise your hand quietly.
General rules.
• This experiment will take approximately 60 minutes. During this time, you
should not leave your station.
• Please turn off and stow away your phone. Starting now, there should be
nothing on your table. (A drink is okay.)
• Please remain quiet for the duration of the experiment, and do not speak
to other participants.
• At the end of the experiment, please remain at your station until your
number is called. You will then receive your payment and sign a receipt.
• You will receive further instructions once all participants have been seated.
Page 1: Rounds, Roles, and Groups. Today’s experiment consists of 9 Rounds
which are conducted independently of one another. This means that your
decisions in any given round have no influence on what will happen in other
rounds. At the end of the experiment, one round will be randomly chosen
for payment. Your payment will depend only on the decisions made in this
randomly chosen round.
At the beginning of the experiment, a “role” will be assigned to each partic-
ipant. Half of the participants will receive “Role A”, the other half “Role B”.
Your role will remain the same for all 9 rounds of the experiment.
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At the beginning of each round, groups will be randomly formed, each con-
sisting of one participant A and one participant B. (You will never be matched
with the same participant twice in a row. It is possible that you will be matched
to the same participant in a later round. However this is not predictable and the
participants remain anonymous in all rounds.)
Page 2: Process within a round. In general: The process within a round is
basically the same in all rounds. First, participant A chooses one of the following
options:
1. Option “Coin flip”: If this option is chosen, participant B will subse-
quently toss a (virtual) coin to determine the payments to the participants.
Participant A will receive 7 EUR in case of “Heads” and 3 EUR in case
of “Tails”. (Heads and Tails are equally likely.) Participant B will receive
5 EUR in both cases.
2. Option “Participant B decides”: If this option is chosen, participant B
will subsequently decide how 17 EUR will be split between the participants.
He will chose between two available divisions (for example 9 for A and
8 for B or 4 for A and 13 for B). Which divisions will be available
to chose from will vary from round to round. Both participants will be
informed about the available choices at the beginning of each round.
Details: In order to better understand the participants’ decisions, we will ask partic-
ipant B to determine an outcome for both of the options that participant A may
chose. While participant A makes his choice, participant B will first toss a (virtual)
coin and then chose between the two available divisions of 17 EUR. Whether the coin
toss or the chosen division counts depends on participant A’s choice. (At this point,
participant B will not know what choice participant A made.)
Page 3: Communication at the beginning of a round. Before the participants
make their decisions, participant B will have the opportunity to send a message
(maximum 200 characters) to participant A. Participant B may not reveal
his identity or identifying characteristics (e.g. “I am the person with the blue
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T-Shirt” or similar). Other than this, it is up to you to decide whether and how
you use this opportunity.
Page 4: Bonus questions at the end of a round (Participant A). After the par-
ticipants have made their decisions, they will have the opportunity to receive
an additional payment by answering a question. Participant A will attempt to
guess what decision participant B has made. And participant B will attempt to
guess, how participant A answers that question. The concrete procedure works
as follows:
• Participant A will report, on a scale of 1-5, how likely he feels it is that
participant B chose the first or the second division. The bonus payment
that participant A will receive for this task depends on his report and on
participant B’s actual choice. This is summarized in the table below (all
numbers represent EUR.)
.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
certainly probably unsure probably certainly
division 1 division 1 division 2 division 2
B’s choice is division 1 0.65 EUR 0.60 EUR 0.50 EUR 0.35 EUR 0.15 EUR
B’s choice is division 2 0.15 EUR 0.35 EUR 0.50 EUR 0.60 EUR 0.65 EUR
(For example, if participant A feels certain that participant B chose division
2, he should report “Certainly division 2”, because if paricipant B actually chose
division 2, he will then receive the largest payment. However, he will then receive
the smallest payment if participant B chose division 1 after all. Therefore, if
participant A feels uncertain, he should consider the other reports as well.)
Page 5: Bonus questions at the end of a round (Participant B).
• Participant B will attempt, at the same time, to guess what answer
participant A will give to this question. That is, participant B will also
chose a column in the table. If he guesses correctly, he will receive 1 EUR
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.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
certainly probably unsure probably certainly
division 1 division 1 division 2 division 2
B’s choice is division 1 0.65 EUR 0.60 EUR 0.50 EUR 0.35 EUR 0.15 EUR
B’s choice is division 2 0.15 EUR 0.35 EUR 0.50 EUR 0.60 EUR 0.65 EUR
(For example, if participant B chooses “(2) probably division 1”, and if partic-
ipant A actually chose “(2) probably division 1”, then Participant B will receive
1 EUR. If participant A chose a different column, participant B will receive 0
EUR.)
At the end of the experiment, one round will be randomly chosen for payment
of the bonus question. This round will be different from the round that is chosen
for payment of the decisions.
Page 5: Summary. To summarize, the following steps are performed sequentially
in each round:
1. Both participants learn what divisions will be available to participant B if
participant A chooses the option “Participant B decides”
2. Participant B can send a message to participant A. If he does so, the
message is immediately displayed to participant A.
3. Participant A chooses one of the options “Coin flip” or “Participant B
decides”. (B is not immediately informed of A’s decision.) At the same
time, participant B throws a (virtual) coin and chooses a division. (Whether
the coin or his choice counts depends on A’s decision.)
4. Both participants answer the bonus question.
After all groups have completed these steps, a new round will immediately begin.
That is, you will not immediately be informed about the decisions made in your
group, the result of the coin flip, or what payments were realized. You will receive
this information only after all 9 rounds of the experiment have been completed.
(See next page.)
Page 7.
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Feedback at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will
receive a detailed summary of your decisions and the results in all 9 rounds.
• If participant A chose “coin toss”, he will learn only the result of the coin
toss, and not which division participant B would have chosen.
• If participant A chose “B choses”, he will learn both the division that B
chose and the result of the coin toss.
In addition, you will be informed about which round was chosen for payment of
the decision and which round was chosen for payment of the bonus question.
Payment. Your payment (including 3 EUR show up fee) will be displayed on the
final screen. Please enter this amount on your receipt and sign it. Then please
wait quietly at your station until your number is called.
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Appendix B. Beliefs
Table B.6: Beliefs
Low High Difference
Feedback
No Communication 2.38 2.11 -0.27 (p = 0.02)
Communication 3.58 3.84 0.26 (p = 0.14)
Promise 4.32 4.24 -0.08 (p = 0.63)
No Feedback
No Communication 2.19 1.99 -0.20 (p = 0.19)
Communication 3.63 3.52 -0.11 (p = 0.37)
Promise 3.97 4.22 0.25 (p = 0.12)
p- values reported are from Sign-Rank test.
We designed the experiment to rule out expectation based guilt aversion as
an explanation for the variation in promise-keeping. In our experiment, Ann
indicated on a scale of 1 to 5 how likely she thinks Bob is going to choose
Fair, 1 indicates that Ann is sure that Bob will not choose the fair option and
5 indicating that she is sure that Bob will choose the fair option. Bob guessed
Ann’s choice in the belief elicitation task, which serves as our measure of Bob’s
second-order belief. Since Bob knows that Ann is unaware of the outside option,
we expect that his stated belief to be independent of the realized outside option.
Table B.6 reports the average beliefs reported at the matching group level. In
the Feedback condition when Bob could not communicate, the average reported
beliefs are 2.38 and 2.11 for the low and the high outcome respectively. The
difference is statistically significant (Sign-Rank, p = 0.02). When Bob could
communicate, the average second-order beliefs reported are higher than when
he could not communicate, 3.58 and 3.84 for the low and the high outcome
respectively, but the difference in belief between the high and low foregone payoff
is not significant (Sign-Rank, p = 0.14). This observation holds true if we restrict
our attention to only those who promised.
In the No Feedback condition, when Bob could not communicate, the average
reported beliefs are 2.19 and 1.99 for the low and the high foregone payoff
respectively. The difference is not statistically significant (Sign-Rank, p = 0.19).
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When Bob could communicate, the average second-order beliefs reported are
higher than the No Communication condition, 3.62 and 3.51 for the low and the
high outcome respectively, but the difference between the two is not significant
(Sign-Rank, p = 0.37).
Table B.7: Linear Probability Model: Controlling for Belief
I
(Feedback)
II
(No Feedback)
III
(Combined)
High
-0.058*
(0.031)
-0.001
(0.046)
-0.003
(0.045)
Communication
-0.031
(0.171)
0.055
(0.192)
0.099
(0.152)
High*Communication
0.183**
(0.065)
-0.066
(0.076)
-0.067
(0.073)
Belief
0.136***
(0.029)
0.161***
(0.021)
0.149***
(0.018)
Belief*Communication
-0.013
(0.052)
0.003
(0.042)
-0.004
(0.034)
Feedback
-0.042
(0.065)
Communication*Feedback
-0.177
(0.119)
High*Feedback
-0.052
(0.054)
High*Communication*Feedback
0.242**
(0.098)
Constant
-0.050
(0.051)
-0.063
(0.066)
-0.037
(0.062)
Number of observations 486 486 972
R2 0.62 0.60 0.60
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the matching group
level. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
We find that the beliefs do not significantly differ between the high and the
low foregone option, except for the No Communication Feedback treatment.
In Table B.7 we control for second-order belief and its interaction term with
38
Communication in our regression analysis. As can be seen from the table, beliefs
do not explain the differential choice of Fair between the high and the low
foregone payoff. The coefficient of HighXCommunication in specification I
and the coefficient of HighXCommunicationXFeedback in specification III
are still positive and significant. This suggests that variation in promise-keeping
due to variation in the foregone payoff is not explained by variation in beliefs.19
Appendix C. Ann’s Choice
Table C.8: Ann’s Choice
Low High Difference
Feedback
No Communication 39.48% 46.41% 6.93% (p = 0.21)
Communication 61.78% 68.96% 7.18% (p = 0.21)
Promise 69.22% 74.02% 4.80% (p = 0.55)
No Feedback
No Communication 39.03% 44.56% 5.53% (p = 0.21)
Communication 55.53% 60.83% 5.30% (p = 0.59)
Promise 70.96% 80.50% 9.52% (p = 0.20)
p- values reported are from Sign-Rank test.
Table C.8 and C.9 shows average investment rates and average belief re-
ported by Ann conditional on the foregone payoff. As Ann made her decisions
without knowing the exact foregone payoff, we did not expect any systematic
variation in choice of investment and beliefs between the high and the low fore-
gone payoff. This is observed in our data. In the No Communication conditions,
the investment rates were 39.48% and 46.41% with feedback and 39.03% and
44.56% without feedback under the low and the high outcome respectively. The
difference in investment rate between the high and the low foregone payoff is not
significant (Feedback, p = 0.21; No Feedback, p = 0.21). In the Communication
19Beliefs have a strong positive impact on the probability of Fair choice. However, this does
not imply that change in belief causes change in the choice of Fair. Beliefs could follow choice
instead of choice following beliefs(Ross et al., 1977; Vanberg, 2019).
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conditions, the investment rates were higher compared to the No Communica-
tion conditions. The investment rates were 61.78% and 68.96% with feedback
and 55.53% and 60.83% without feedback under the low and the high foregone
payoff respectively. However, there is no significant difference in the investment
rate between the high and the low foregone payoff (Feedback, p = 0.21; No
Feedback, p = 0.59).
Table C.9: Ann’s Belief
Low High Difference
Feedback
No Communication 2.34 2.40 0.06 (p = 0.81)
Communication 3.41 3.29 -0.11 (p = 0.77)
Promise 3.80 3.93 0.13 (p = 0.67)
No Feedback
No Communication 2.43 2.41 -0.02 (p = 1.00)
Communication 3.21 3.21 0.00 (p = 0.86)
Promise 3.72 3.64 -0.08 (p = 0.44)
p- values reported are from Rank Sum test.
As Table C.9 shows, the average beliefs stated by Ann are also independent of
the foregone payoff. In No Communication conditions, the average belief stated
is 2.34 and 2.40 under Feedback and 2.43 and 2.41 under No Feedback for the
low and the high outcome respectively. In both Feedback and No Feedback
condition without communication, the beliefs stated does not depend on the
foregone payoff (Feedback, p = 0.81; No Feedback, p = 1.00). When Bob could
communicate, Ann stated higher beliefs. In the Communication condition, the
average belief stated is 3.41 and 3.29 with Feedback and 3.21 and 3.21 without
Feedback under both the low and the high outcome. The stated beliefs do not
significantly vary with the foregone payoff (Feedback, p = 0.21; No Feedback,
p = 0.59).
Table C.10 and C.11 shows the average investment rates and beliefs by treat-
ments. Communication has a significant positive effect on investment and beliefs
for both Feedback and No Feedback conditions. With Communication, the aver-
age investment rate significantly increased by 18.11% point in the No Feedback
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Table C.10: Ann’s Choice by Treatments
No Communication Communication Promise Column Difference
No Feedback 41.15% 59.26% 72.12% 18.11 (p = 0.03)
Feedback 43.21% 62.96% 71.86% 19.75 (p = 0.06)
Row Difference 2.06 (p = 0.89) 3.70 (p = 0.63)
p- values reported are from Rank Sum test.
condition (Rank Sum, p = 0.03) and by 19.75% with Feedback (Rank Sum,
p = 0.03). Similarly, the belief increased from 2.41 to 3.23 in the No Feed-
back condition (Rank Sum, p = 0.008) and from 2.37 to 3.38 in the Feedback
condition (Rank Sum, p = 0.008).
Table C.11: Ann’s Belief by Treatments
No Communication Communication Promise Column Difference
No Feedback 2.41 3.23 3.48 0.82 (p = 0.008)
Feedback 2.37 3.38 3.71 1.00 (p = 0.001)
Row Difference .04 (p = 0.96) 0.15 (p = 0.82)
p- values reported are from Rank Sum test.
Feedback has no impact on both beliefs, and choices Ann make. In the
No Communication condition, the average investment rate is 41.15% under No
Feedback and 43.21% under Feedback. With Communication, the average in-
vestment rate is 59.26% under No Feedback and 62.96% under Feedback. The
effect of Feedback on choice of investment is insignificant (No Communication,
p = 0.89; Communication, p = 0.63). For beliefs, in the No Communication
condition, the average belief is 2.41 under No Feedback and 2.37 under Feed-
back. With Communication, the average belief is 3.23 under No Feedback and
3.38 under Feedback. The effect of Feedback on belief is also insignificant (No
Communication, p = 0.96; Communication, p = 0.82).
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Appendix D. Regression Results
Table D.12: Linear Probability Model: Promise
I
(Feedback)
II
(No Feedback)
III
(Combined)
high
-0.087**
(0.035)
-0.032
(0.058)
-0.032
(0.057)
Promise
0.129
(0.105)
0.448***
(0.083)
0.448***
(0.082)
high*Promise
0.243***
(0.063)
-0.040
(0.096)
-0.040
(0.094)
Feedback
-0.016
(0.076)
Promise*Feedback
-0.320**
(0.132)
high*Feedback
-0.055
(0.067)
high*Promise*Feedback
0.282***
(0.113)
Constant
0.271***
(0.060)
0.287***
(0.048)
0.287***
(0.047)
Number of observations 425 394 819
R2 0.08 0.18 0.14
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the match-
ing group level. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table D.13: Linear Probability Model: Promise and Controlling for Belief
I
(Feedback)
II
(No Feedback)
III
(Combined)
high
-0.058*
(0.031)
-0.001
(0.046)
-0.003
(0.045)
Promise
-0.139
(0.196)
-0.057
(0.235)
0.034
(0.179)
high*Promise
0.170**
(0.059)
-0.027
(0.084)
-0.031
(0.084)
Belief
0.136***
(0.029)
0.161***
(0.021)
0.149***
(0.018)
Belief*Promise
0.014
(0.058)
0.038
(0.050)
0.023
(0.039)
Feedback
-0.042
(0.065)
Promise*Feedback
-0.225*
(0.117)
high*Feedback
-0.052
(0.054)
high*Promise*Feedback
0.193*
(0.101)
Constant
-0.050
(0.051)
-0.063
(0.066)
-0.037
(0.062)
Number of observations 420 394 814
R2 0.62 0.60 0.60
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the match-
ing group level. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table D.14: Mixed Effect Logit Model
I
(Feedback)
II
(No Feedback)
III
(Combined)
high
-0.557*
(0.337)
-0.129
(0.302)
-0.126
(0.304)
Communication
0.500
(0.601)
1.392***
(0.440)
1.420***
(0.512)
high*Communication
1.385***
(0.461)
-0.246
(0.412)
-0.253
(0.416)
Feedback
-0.174
(0.517)
Communication*Feedback
-0.952
(0.722)
high*Feedback
-0.422
(0.451)
high*Communication*Feedback
1.606***
(0.617)
Constant
1.204***
(0.568)
0.481**
(0.235)
0.778***
(0.262)
Number of observations 486 486 972
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the matching group
level. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table D.15: Probit Model
I
(Feedback)
II
(No Feedback)
III
(Combined)
high
-0.291**
(0.120)
-0.098
(0.176)
-0.098
(0.176)
Communication
0.238
(0.269)
0.797***
(0.204)
0.797***
(0.201)
high*Communication
0.703***
(0.194)
-0.145
(0.230)
-0.145
(0.227)
Feedback
-0.046
(0.225)
Communication*Feedback
-0.559*
(0.333)
high*Feedback
-0.193
(0.210)
high*Communication*Feedback
0.849***
(0.297)
Constant
-0.609***
(0.181)
-0.563***
(0.137)
0.778***
(0.262)
Number of observations 486 486 972
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the matching group
level. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table D.16: Mixed Effect Logit Model: Promise
I
(Feedback)
II
(No Feedback)
III
(Combined)
high
-0.568*
(0.340)
-0.126
(0.304)
-0.122
(0.306)
Promise
1.038
(0.795)
2.290***
(0.577)
2.388***
(0.691)
high*Promise
1.419***
(0.518)
-0.193
(0.510)
-0.198
(0.522)
Feedback
-0.231
(0.636)
Promise*Feedback
-1.453
(0.945)
high*Feedback
-0.437
(0.455)
high*Promise*Feedback
1.575**
(0.728)
Constant
2.231**
(1.074)
0.766**
(0.384)
1.365***
(0.471)
Number of observations 425 394 819
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the match-
ing group level. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table D.17: Probit Model: Promise
I
(Feedback)
II
(No Feedback)
III
(Combined)
high
-0.291**
(0.120)
-0.098
(0.176)
-0.098
(0.170)
Promise
0.355
(0.287)
1.192***
(0.248)
1.192***
(0.245)
high*Promise
0.684***
(0.177)
-0.111
(0.264)
-0.111
(0.261)
Feedback
-0.046
(0.225)
Promise*Feedback
-0.836**
(0.374)
high*Feedback
-0.193
(0.210)
high*Promise*Feedback
0.795**
(0.314)
Constant
-0.609***
(0.181)
-0.563***
(0.137)
-0.563***
(0.137)
Number of observations 486 486 972
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are clustered at the match-
ing group level. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Appendix E. Variation of Unfair Payoff
Table E.18: Feedback: Variation of Unfair Payoff
low high Difference = high - low
Unfair
(4,13)
Communication 42.53% 60.55% 18.01 (p = 0.02)
No Communication 25% 19.25% -5.74 (p = 0.02)
Unfair
(3,14)
Communication 34.37% 41.25% 6.87 (p = 0.02)
No Communication 16.50% 14.81% -1.69 (p = 0.02)
Unfair
(2,15)
Communication 26.81% 48.95% 22.54 (p = 0.02)
No Communication 34.20% 24.81% -9.49 (p = 0.02)
Table E.19: No Feedback: Variation of Unfair Payoff
low high Difference = high - low
Unfair
(4,13)
Communication 54.33% 53.33% -1.0 (p = 0.905)
No Communication 25.55% 25.18% -0.3 (p = 0.81)
Unfair
(3,14)
Communication 66.34%% 53.80% -12.53 (p = 0.44)
No Communication 32.26% 17.51% -14.74 (p = 0.12)
Unfair
(2,15)
Communication 50.18% 43.09% -7.08 (p = 0.44)
No Communication 27.40% 32.77% 0.05(p = 0.67)
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Appendix F. Experiment Screen Shots
Figure F.5: B’s Message Stage
Figure F.6: A’s Message and Choice Stage
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Figure F.7: B’s Coin Flip Stage
Figure F.8: B’s Choice Stage
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Figure F.9: A’s Belief Stage
Figure F.10: B’s Belief Stage
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